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Abstract 
A lack of adequate access to autobiographical knowledge has been related to psychopathology. More 
specifically, patients suffering from depression or a history of trauma have been found to be 
characterized by overgeneral memory, in other words, they show a relative difficulty in retrieving a 
specific event from memory located in time and place. Previous studies of overgeneral memory have 
not included patients with dissociative disorders. These patients are interesting to consider, as they 
are hypothesized to have the ability to selectively compartmentalize information linked to negative 
emotions. This study examined avoidance and overgeneral memory in patients with Dissociative 
Identity Disorder (DID; n=12). The patients completed the autobiographical memory test (AMT). 
Their performance was compared to control groups of PTSD patients (n = 26), healthy controls (n = 
29), and DID simulators (n = 26). Specifically, we compared the performance of separate identity 
states in DID hypothesized to diverge in the use of avoidance as a coping strategy to deal with 
negative affect. No significant differences in memory specificity were found between the separate 
identities in DID. Irrespective of identity state, DID patients were characterized by a lack of memory 
specificity, which was similar to the lack of memory specificity found in PTSD patients. The 
converging results for DID and PTSD patients add empirical evidence for the role of overgeneral 
memory involved in the maintenance of posttraumatic psychopathology.  
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Autobiographical Memory Specificity in Dissociative Identity Disorder 
Autobiographical memory is of fundamental significance for well-being and the sense of a 
coherent and consistent personal identity. Conversely, a lack of adequate access to autobiographical 
knowledge has been related to psychopathology. More specifically, people suffering from depression 
or a trauma-related disorder may fail to retrieve a specific episode (i.e., an event within a restricted 
time period) from memory when asked to do so (Moore & Zoellner, 2007; Williams et al., 2007). 
Instead, they tend to retrieve overgeneral memories like categories of events (e.g., “every time I 
visited my grandparents”). 
It is generally assumed that there are three factors that may underlie overgeneral memory, 
that is, Capture and Rumination, Functional Avoidance, and impaired eXecutive control (CaRFAX 
model; Williams et al., 2007). Especially with regard to posttraumatic reactions, functional avoidance 
is thought to play a role (e.g. Spinhoven, Bamelis, Molendijk, Haringsma, & Arntz, 2009). In the 
intentional retrieval of an autobiographical memory, people ordinarily engage in a top-down memory 
search through a hierarchically organized autobiographical knowledge base (see also Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The retrieval is thought to be initiated at a general descriptive level and then 
move down to a more concrete level containing perceptual–sensory details of events. According to 
the CaRFAX model (Williams et al., 2007), overgeneral memory might arise when individuals truncate 
their intentional search of specifically adverse events at the general descriptive level. This way, they 
would avoid the intense negative affect accompanying retrieval of more specific perceptual–sensory 
details. The tendency to truncate retrieval may further generalize to other memory types (including 
positive and neutral memories), resulting in a pervasive overgeneral retrieval style (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Hermans, Defranc, Raes, Williams, & Eelen, 2005).  
 With regard to trauma-related disorders, studies so far have focused on Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) and have found evidence for the role of lack of memory specificity in the onset 
and the maintenance of this disorder (Bryant, Sutherland, Guthrie, 2007; Moore & Zoellner, 2007. In 
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addition, one study (Harvey, Bryant, & Dang, 1998) found evidence of overgeneral memory in Acute 
Stress Disorder, a diagnosis requiring the presence of dissociative symptoms in addition to the PTSD 
symptom-clusters of re-experiencing, avoidance, and hyperarousal within the first month after 
trauma. In this study, a strong link (r = -.45) was found between dissociative reactions and memory 
specificity, but not between specificity and the PTSD symptom clusters. Further examining this link 
between overgeneral memory and dissociative symptoms is interesting given that many theories of 
dissociation are based on the idea that dissociative patients have the ability to selectively forget or 
compartmentalize information linked to negative emotions in order to minimize distress (Cloitre, 
1992; Dorahy & Huntjens, 2007). However, studies investigating the link between overgeneral 
memory and dissociative symptomatology, including samples with borderline personality disorder, 
depression, and nonclinical dissociators, yielded mixed results (Jones et al., 1999; Kremers, 
Spinhoven, & van der Does, 2004; Renneberg, Theobald, Nobs, & Weisbrod, 2005; Wessel, 
Merckelbach, Kessels, & Horselenberg, 2001). It should be noted that the studies that did not find a 
significant relation between dissociation and overgeneral memory relied on samples with relatively 
low dissociation scores. These low scores might have been responsible for a lack of empirical 
association. It therefore seems essential to include samples of patients with dissociative disorders in 
studies of overgeneral memory.  
The most severe and chronic disorder in the diagnostic category of dissociative disorders is 
Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID). DID patients experience an extreme form of identity alteration, 
or the presence of two or more distinct identities or personality states which in turn take control of 
the person’s behavior. Each of these states is considered to have its own relatively enduring pattern 
of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and self. These identities serve very 
different functions.  In trauma identity states, patients focus on traumatic memories, reliving the 
events and engaging in defensive actions when they feel threatened. In contrast, in what is called 
“apparently normal” identity states, the patients do not relate the trauma to themselves. Instead, 
patients are thought to concentrate on daily life functioning in these states and (both consciously 
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and preconsciously) avoid the retrieval of traumatic memories (Reinders et al., 2006; Steele, van der 
Hart, & Nijenhuis, 2009).  
Evidence for a particular pattern of memory retrieval across different identities comes from 
two case studies. In the first study, Schacter, Kihlstrom, Kihlstrom, and Berren, (1989) used an 
autobiographical cueing procedure. A DID patient was presented with common words (i.e., object, 
activity, and affect words) as retrieval cues and was asked to produce and date a memory of a specific 
episode from her past that was related to the cue. The patient was tested in an apparently normal 
identity state (i.e., the predominant identity), in which she reported no awareness of the existence of 
the other identities. The results indicated that the patient showed a recency bias in that she did not 
report memories from childhood. The authors speculated that the patient reported so few memories 
from childhood because at that time, the identity tested may not have ‘existed’ as she may have only 
arisen to cope with sexual abuse beginning in early adolescence. Bryant (1995) followed up on this 
suggestion by using a similar procedure in another DID patient, testing whether childhood memories 
were accessible by means of a second identity. This was a child trauma identity claiming awareness 
of childhood abuse for which the predominant identity reported amnesia. The results indicated that 
the predominant identity reported mainly recent positive memories and the child identity reported 
mainly negative memories from childhood. Taken together, these previous studies indicate that 
patients with DID report different autobiographical memories across identities, with (positive) recent 
memories reported in apparently normal identity states, and early negative memories reported in a 
trauma state. Following upon these early case studies, several more recent studies have examined 
memory functioning, more specifically reports of amnesia in apparently normal identity states in DID, 
by means of more objective memory testing (e.g., Huntjens, Verschuere, & McNally, 2012; for an 
overview see Dorahy & Huntjens, 2007). The results of these studies collide such that while patients 
in their apparently normal state may show diminished emotional reactivity in response to trauma-
related information (Reinders et al., 2006), the patients’ subjective reports of amnesia are not 
substantiated by objective testing, i.e., there is transfer of information between different identities 
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comparable to healthy controls. Instead, identity states in DID might show other types of differential 
memory functioning, including different patterns of autobiographical memory specificity. In light of 
the functional avoidance hypothesis of overgeneral memory, DID patients may be characterized by a 
lack of memory specificity especially in their apparently normal state.  
The first aim of the current study was to compare memory specificity of apparently normal 
identity states and trauma identity states. We used the standard autobiographical memory test 
(AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986), from which indexes of autobiographical memory specificity as 
well as response times can be derived. Additionally, participants dated their specific memories, and 
rated the valence and trauma-relatedness of each specific memory. Given that different identities 
are considered to serve different functions, that is, avoidant responding in the apparently normal 
identity state and trauma preoccupation in the trauma state, we expected a tendency to retrieve 
fewer specific memories in the apparently normal identity state. In addition, the patients were 
expected to retrieve relatively neutral, non-trauma-related, recent memories in this identity state. In 
the trauma identity state, in contrast, patients were expected to retrieve negatively valenced, 
trauma-related and relatively early memories.  
The performance of these different identities in DID was compared to the performance of 
healthy amateur actors instructed to mimic DID. The latter group was included because there is an 
ongoing debate about the origins of the symptoms seen in DID patients. Whereas theories of 
dissociation are based on the idea that the creation of alters is a defensive reaction to trauma (e.g., 
Dalenberg et al.; 2012, Gleaves, 1996), an alternative account argues that DID is not directly linked to 
trauma, but consists of multiple role enactments (Lilienfeld et al., 1999; Lynn, Lilienfeld, 
Merckelbach, Giesbrecht, & van der Kloet, 2012). Given this ongoing debate about the disorder, 
many previous studies have included a simulator group instructed to mimic task performance in 
different, imagined identities (e.g., Eich, Macaulay, Loewenstein, & Dihle, 1997; Huntjens, Postma, 
Peters, Woertman, & van der Hart, 2003; Reinders, Willemsen, Vos, Den Boer, & Nijenhuis, 2012). 
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We adhered to this practice by including a group of amateur actors who were asked to create two 
imaginary identities. One identity was to have memories of personally experienced childhood sexual 
abuse (denoted the trauma identity), whereas the other was instructed not to acknowledge the 
abuse (denoted the apparently normal identity). Just as DID patients, the simulators performed the 
AMT task twice, once in each identity. In their trauma state, we instructed them to retrieve 
memories of the trauma identity, thus including past traumatic experiences, while in their apparently 
normal state, we instructed them not to retrieve memories of past trauma. Simulators were not 
given specific information on the expected differences between identities on memory specificity, as 
we considered DID patients also to be unaware of these expectations. By inclusion of the simulators, 
we did not want to verify whether it was possible to simulate a lack of memory specificity on the 
basis of detailed knowledge about the AMT. Instead, we provided simulators with a description of 
the differential identity functions and aimed to investigate whether the creation of a trauma identity 
and an apparently normal identity based on this description would result in differential performance 
of these identities on the AMT task. 
Secondly, we wanted to compare DID patients and PTSD patients. Several authors have 
suggested a specific diagnostic category called complex PTSD (Herman, 1992) or disorders of extreme 
stress not otherwise specified (DESNOS; Roth, Newman, Pelcovitz, van der Kolk, & Mandel, 1997) for 
patients suffering from symptoms following a history of early and chronic childhood sexual abuse. 
We compared similarities and differences on the AMT task performance between PTSD and 
DID patients. These two patient groups are suggested to be merged in this suggested joint diagnostic 
category of complex PTSD, but at the moment are separate diagnostic categories.  The overall (i.e., 
across identities) DID patient performance was contrasted with that of a PTSD group consisting of 
patients with a comparable history of early and chronic childhood sexual abuse. We chose this group 
to ensure comparable severity of trauma history. Additionally, a benchmark group of healthy 
controls was added. 
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Method 
Participants 
Twelve female DID patients participated in the study. Controls were 31 healthy participants, 26 
DID simulating participants, and 27 patients with PTSD. The PTSD patients all reported a history of 
repeated sexual and/or physical abuse starting in childhood. All participants were female. We 
recruited DID and PTSD patients from treatment settings in the Netherlands and Belgium by asking 
clinicians to invite patients to participate. DID or PTSD was always the primary diagnosis.  
 Use of medication was allowed. The PTSD status was verified with the Clinician-Administered 
PTSD Scale (CAPS; Blake et al., 1995). The psychometric properties of this scale are excellent (Blake et 
al., 1995). The clinician’s diagnosis of DID was verified with the Dutch version of the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Dissociative Disorders (SCID-D; Steinberg, 1993). Boon and Draijer 
(1993) reported an excellent interrater reliability for presence versus absence of a dissociative 
disorder and for type of dissociative disorder.  
The mean number of reported identities was 28 (range 4-39 with an exception of 196). 
Patients self-selected two identities for participation in the experiment, with one identity reporting 
awareness of a traumatic past (called the trauma identity) and the other identity reporting no 
memories of personally experienced trauma (called the apparently normal identity). Furthermore, 
the selection of identities was based on: (1) the ability to switch between identities on request; (2) 
the ability to perform the tasks without spontaneous switches to or interference from other 
identities; (3) the ability to read and write, and (4) sufficient stability to perform computer tasks. 
The healthy control participants were community volunteers who responded to a newspaper 
advertisement. We excluded potential participants who reported any relevant memory, visual, or 
attention problems and control participants who reported a history of sexual and/or physical abuse 
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(all self-report). All healthy control participants were screened for current psychiatric disorders using 
the Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I.; Sheehan et al., 1998). 
Additionally, we included 26 participants instructed to mimic DID. The simulator group 
consisted of female amateur actors. We showed them a documentary film1 about a DID patient and 
gave them additional written information about DID. Subsequently, we asked them to create two 
imaginary identities. One identity had to have memories of personally experienced childhood sexual 
abuse (denoted the trauma identity), whereas the other was instructed not to acknowledge the 
abuse (denoted the apparently normal identity). Following the procedure of previous studies on DID 
(Huntjens, Postma, Peters, Woertman, & van der Hart, 2003; Silberman, 1985), simulators received a 
data sheet for the identity on which we asked them to assign a name, age, gender, physical 
description, personal history, and personality style of the identities. Finally, we asked them to 
practice switching their identities during the week preceding their participation in the experiment.  
Measures 
Questionnaires 
Trait dissociation was measured using the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES, (Carlson & 
Putnam, 1993)). The DES is a 28-item self-report questionnaire with scores ranging from 0 to 100. 
Scores above 20 or more conservatively, above 30 suggest pathological dissociation. The DES has 
been used in well over 200 published studies and its psychometric properties are well attested (van 
IJzendoorn & Schuengel, 1996). In the present sample, the DES demonstrated good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α = .97).  
To index trauma history, the Traumatic Experiences Checklist (TEC; Nijenhuis, van der Hart, & 
Kruger, 2002)) was included. The TEC is a self-report measure addressing the presence or absence of 
                                                          
1
 i.e., parts of the documentary “Multiple personalities. The search for deadly memories” available on 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B0LNyXsErb8. 
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potentially traumatizing events, focusing on emotional trauma, physical abuse, and sexual trauma. 
Good validity and reliability are reported (Nijenhuis et al., 2002), with Cronbach’s α in the current 
study .92 for the total scale, which was reported in the present study.  
PTSD Symptom Scale Self-Report version (PSS-SR). The PSS-SR is a 17-item measure 
developed by Foa, Riggs, Dancu, and Rothbaum (1993) that taps PTSD symptoms. Respondents rate 
the frequency of each symptom on 4-point scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (five or more times 
per week/almost always). As the majority of participants reported multiple traumas, questions were 
anchored to the trauma causing the most distress. Control participants responded to the PSS-SR in 
relation to the most distressing event. The English (Foa, Riggs, Dancu, & Rothbaum, 1993) and Dutch 
versions (Engelhard, Arntz, & van den Hout, 2007) have good psychometric properties. Cronbach’s α 
in the current sample was .97. 
We included the depression subscale of the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Derogatis & 
Melisaratos, 1983). Higher scores indicate higher levels of symptom experience. The reliability, 
validity, and utility of the BSI have been tested in more than 400 research studies (Derogatis & 
Melisaratos, 1983). Cronbach’s α for the 6-item depression subscale in the current sample was .95. 
To measure avoidance we included a trauma-related version of the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire – Trauma Specific (AAQ-TS; Land, 2011) and the Posttraumatic Avoidance Behaviour 
Questionnaire (PABQ; van Minnen & Hagenaars, 2010). The AAQ-TS consists of 37 items referring to 
the avoidance of trauma-related feelings, memories, and thoughts. Example items are “If I could 
magically get rid of my thoughts and feelings about the trauma, I would”, and “I am willing to have 
memories about the trauma if it means that I get to live a full life” (reverse scoring). The items are 
answered on a scale from 1 (never) to 7 (always). Psychometric details of this scale are not yet 
available. Cronbach’s α in the current sample was .96.  
The PABQ is a 25 item questionnaire indexing behavioral avoidance. Example items 
include “Since the trauma, I avoid reading trauma-related books/magazines/newspapers” and 
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“Since the trauma, I avoid going to bed”. The respondents rate each item on a 4-point scale 
ranging from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). The psychometric properties proved 
adequate (van Minnen & Hagenaars, 2010). Cronbach’s α in the current sample was .95. 
Material and procedure Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT) 
We used a standard AMT task (Williams & Broadbent, 1986). Five positive (happy, surprised, 
interested, successful, safe) and five negative (clumsy, angry, sorry, hurt, lonely) words, printed on 
separate cards, served as memory cues. The cues were presented in a different random order for 
each participant, with positive and negative cues alternating.  Memories were categorized according 
to whether they were specific or overgeneral. The latter memories were further categorized by virtue 
of referring to a whole class of events (categorical memories, e.g., “every time I had to sit in the 
basement”), memories that were overgeneral because they referred to an extended period of time 
(extended memories, e.g., “when I lived with my grandmother”), and semantic associates (e.g. “I am a 
clumsy person”). A second rater (research assistant, MA level) rated a subsample of 20 participants 
for specificity. The inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s κ) was .72. 
We informed the participants that the task was about memories about past events and that 
they would be shown a series of cue words and would be asked to retrieve a different, specific 
personal memory in response to each cue word. They were told that the event recalled could be 
important or trivial and recent or from a long time ago, but that it should be a specific event, 
something that happened to the participant at a particular place and time and lasted no longer than 
a day. It was emphasized that by personal memory, we meant events that they could explicitly 
remember rather than events that they had learned about from other sources. The experimenter 
provided examples of memories that would and would not qualify. The participants were informed 
that they had up to one minute to recall a specific memory in response to each cue word.  
All participants were first asked to retrieve a specific memory in response to a maximum of 
10 practice words. They were given unlimited time and prompts until they recalled at least 3 specific 
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memories in direct succession. Then the actual test phase started. The experimenter presented each 
card to the participant and said the word out loud, activating a stopwatch as soon as the word was 
shown. The experimenter terminated the trial as soon as the participant gave a response or until one 
minute elapsed, whichever came first, and recorded the time in s to respond. If the participant 
retrieved a memory that did not qualify, the experimenter asked: “Can you think of a specific 
memory? A specific event that happened on a particular day?” 
Additional AMT measures 
For each retrieved specific memory, we asked the participants: to date the memory, to 
indicate how they currently felt about the retrieved memory on a 7-point scale (1 = very negative to 
7 = very positive), and to rate all retrieved specific memories for trauma-relatedness (i.e., the 
experiences as reported on the TEC; 1 = not related at all to 7 = very much related). DID patients 
performed this rating task in their host identity or another identity that was knowledgeable about 
the patient’s trauma history. Simulators performed this task as themselves, relating the events to the 
traumatic index event(s) as reported by the trauma identity.  
Procedure 
The DID and PTSD patients were tested by the first author, while the healthy control 
participants and simulators were tested by research assistants. Written informed consent was 
obtained prior to participation. The patients were informed that the aim of the study was to 
understand more about trauma-related disorders. They were tested individually at their treatment 
centre and the test circumstances were as standard as possible (i.e., quiet test room). In the first 
session, they completed the written consent form, completed the diagnostic interviews, and filled in 
several questionnaires in a fixed order (DES, BSI, TEC, PSS-SR, PABQ, and AAQ-TS). The DID patients 
completed the diagnostic interviewing and the questionnaires in their “host” identity. In the second 
session, one week later, the patients carried out the AMT. DID patients completed the AMT twice, 
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once in their apparently normal identity and once in their trauma identity, with the order of identity 
counterbalanced across participants.  
Participants in the healthy control group were told only that they were participating in an 
experiment on psychological complaints. To them no information was provided on the trauma- and 
DID-related aspects of the study. These participants completed the diagnostic screening by 
telephone and completed the questionnaires at home in the week prior to the experiment, which 
was performed at the university laboratory. The simulator participants completed the screening and 
questionnaires as themselves (i.e., not simulating), and the AMT task in their imagined trauma and 
apparently normal state. The task instruction in the apparently normal identity was to retrieve 
memories of events as experienced in this identity state, not including memories of trauma. In the 
trauma identity, the instruction was to retrieve memories of the trauma identity, thus including past 
traumatic experiences.  
The study was approved by the Medical Ethical Committee of the University Medical Centre 
Groningen, The Netherlands. The current study was part of a larger study on which we reported 
elsewhere (Huntjens, Verschuere, & McNally, 2012)2. All participants received payment of 50 Euros. 
Results  
One control participant was unable to satisfactorily complete the practice phase (i.e., she was unable 
to come up with three specific memories). This participant was removed from the data. Initial 
inspection of the data revealed several statistical outliers. Analyses with either ex- or inclusion of 
these outliers yielded comparable results. One control participant was an outlier on multiple AMT 
measures (i.e., scored more than 2 SD from the mean on memory specificity, retrieval time, and 
trauma-relatedness) and was removed from the data. 
                                                          
2
 The number of the control and simulator participants in the current paper (n=55) differs slightly from this 
previous paper (n=50). For the task described in Huntjens et al 2012, each participant was matched to a DID 
patient based on certain task characteristics (i.e., answers on questions about autobiographical information), as 
described in the paper. Also, in the current study, one additional DID patient was included who agreed to 
participate at a later stage.    
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The participants’ demographics and scores on several self-report questionnaires are 
summarized in Table 1. For the results in this table, we report Kruskal-Wallis test results for the 
overall group comparison and Mann-Whitney U tests for the pairwise comparisons, given several 
violations of parametric test assumptions. The analyses indicated that the groups did not differ on 
age, χ2 (3) = 0.85, p = .84. The groups did differ significantly on level of education, χ2 (3) = 15.53, p = 
.001, with PTSD patients scoring significantly lower compared to healthy controls (U = 175.50, z = -
3.80, p < .001, r = 0.51), and simulators (U = 490.00, z = 2.58, p = .01, r = 0.35). DID patients did not 
differ significantly from controls (U = 120.50, z = -1.86, p = .13, r = 0.29), simulators (U = 185.00, z = 
0.99, p = .32, r = 0.16), nor PTSD patients (U = 210.00, z = 1.55, p = .15, r = 0.25). On the TEC, the 
group difference was also significant, χ2 (3) = 59.54, p < .001. The patient groups (DID and PTSD) did 
not differ significantly ((U = 202.00, z = 1.22, p = .23, r = 0.20), yet, as expected, they scored 
significantly higher than controls and simulators (all p’s < .001). This pattern was also found for DES 
dissociative symptoms, χ2 (3) = 54.68, p < .001, PSS-SR posttraumatic stress symptoms, χ2 (3) = 68.25, 
p < .001, AAQ-TS trauma-related experiential avoidance, χ2 (3) = 65.77, p < .001, PABQ avoidance, χ2 
(3) = 63.51, p < .001, and BSI-depression, χ2 (3) = 61.45, p <.001. The DID and PTSD patient groups 
only differed on DES dissociative symptoms, with DID patients scoring higher (U = 263.00, z = 3.07, p 
= .002, r = 0.49). Simulators did not differ significantly on any of the measures employed compared to 
control participants (p values between .13 and .84). 
Autobiographical memory specificity for trauma versus apparently normal identities 
The mean scores for trauma and apparently normal identities on memory specificity are 
presented in Table 23. We first checked the extent to which responses for different identities to the 
same cue words overlapped. In simulators, we found an overlap in one answer out of the total of 260 
cue words (i.e., 10 cue words for 26 participants). In DID patients, there was an overlap in 6 out of 
                                                          
3
 Variable transformations were used where appropriate according to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). We used a 
square root transformation for the memory specificity variable and trauma-relatedness rating, a log10 
transformation for the mean time in s to retrieve memories. If a transformation still did not result in a normally 
distributed variable, nonparametric tests were performed. 
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the total 120 cue words (i.e., 10 cue words for each of the 12 patients). So overall, the identities 
differed in their responses except for a very small overlap. Comparing the DID trauma and apparently 
normal identities on memory specificity in a paired samples t-test revealed that the DID identities did 
not differ significantly on memory specificity, t(11) = .42, p = .68, η2  = .02. The simulator trauma and 
apparently normal identity also did not differ significantly, t(25) = 1.47, p = .16, η2  =.08. We found no 
significant differences on the number of categorical memories for the DID identities using a Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test (z = .36, p = .72, r = .0.08) but the difference between  the simulator identities 
approached significance (z = 1.72, p = .09, r = 0.24), with the simulators retrieving more categorical 
memories in their trauma identity. No significant difference was found in the number of extended 
memories between the DID identities (z = -0.11, p = .91, r = 0.02) nor between the simulator 
identities (z = -1.38, p = .17, r = 0.19), and also no significant differences in the number of semantic 
associates between the DID identities (z = -1.20, p = .23, r = 0.24) and the simulator identities (z = -
1.08, p = .28, r = 0.15). 
The DID trauma identities took significantly more time to respond on the AMT task, t(11) = 
3.73, p = .003, η2 = .56, and also more time to retrieve specific memories t(11) = 2.33, p = .04, η2  = .33 
compared to the apparently normal identities. The difference between identities for the simulators 
on time to respond was not significant.  
Comparing the DID trauma and apparently normal identities on ratings for trauma-
relatedness revealed a difference approaching significance between the identities of DID patients, 
t(11) = 2.07, p = .06, η2  =.28. The same pattern was found for the simulators, and with these 
participants the pattern was significant, , t(25) = 5.23, p < .001, η2  =.52, with the memories of the 
trauma identities rated for both groups as more trauma-related when compared to the memories of 
the apparently normal identities. No differences between identities emerged on the valence ratings 
for DID patients, t(11) = 0.58, p = .57, η2  =.03, nor for simulators t(25) = .04, p = .97, η2  = <.001. Finally, 
on age of the retrieved specific memories, no significant difference emerged for the DID trauma and 
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apparently normal identity, z = .47, p = .64, r = .11 (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test). For the simulators, 
however, the difference between identities was significant, z = 3.24, p = .001, r = .45, with trauma 
identities dating their memories as older compared to apparently normal identities.  
Autobiographical memory specificity for DID patients compared to PTSD patients and healthy 
controls.  
The mean scores for the patient groups and controls on memory specificity are presented in Table 3. 
The overall Spearman’s rho correlation between trait dissociation (DES) and memory specificity was -
.32 (p = .009). We compared group means by way of two-way ANOVAS with participant group (PTSD, 
DID, and healthy controls) and level of education (low, high)4 as factors. Given the similar 
performance of the apparently normal and trauma identities of the DID patients, the average of their 
scores were used in these analyses. We included level of education as a factor in the ANOVA 
analyses5 and report significant main effects and/or interaction effects6.  
A two-way ANOVA indicated significant differences for the participant groups, F(2, 62) = 5.18, 
p = .008, partial η2 = .147. Post-hoc comparisons8 indicated that both PTSD patients (p = .004) as well 
as DID patients (p = .037) retrieved fewer specific memories than healthy controls. The patient 
groups did not differ significantly on memory specificity (p = .99).  
On extended memories, an overall Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that the groups differed 
significantly, χ2 (2) = 6.25, p = .04. On this measure, Mann-Whitney U tests indicated that PTSD 
                                                          
4
 To avoid small cell sizes, we computed an ordinal variable with two values (i.e., lower to middle education 
level combining scores 1 to 5, and higher education level combining scores 6 and 7). 
5
 Miller and Chapman (2001) advise against using a covariance analysis when covariates contain nonrandom 
group differences. 
6
 For sake of completeness, we also performed regression analyses for the variables meeting assumptions for 
parametric testing (memory specificity, mean time to respond, mean time to retrieve specific memories, 
trauma-relatedness, and valence). In these analyses, level of education was included as a continuous variable, 
while dummy variables were included for the groups. These analyses revealed comparable results, except that 
the difference between DID patients and controls on valence approached significance, p = .074.  
7
 With the inclusion of the control outlier, the results on memory specificity were F(2,63) = 4.49, p = .015, 
partial η
2  = 
.13
. 
On time to respond, the results were F(2,63) = 0.38, p = .69, partial η
2  = 
.01. On trauma-
relatedness, the results were F(2,62) = 7.08, p = .002, partial η
2  = 
.19. 
8
 We report Gabriel’s pairwise comparisons tests as these are powerful in case of unequal cell sizes (Gabriel, 
1969) 
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patients scored significantly higher compared to healthy controls U = 524.00, z = 2.31, p = .02, r = 
0.31. They showed a marginally significant tendency to score higher than DID patients, U = 105.00, z 
= -1.79, p = .09, r = 0.29. DID patients did not differ significantly from healthy controls, U = 176.00, z = 
0.06, p = .97, r = 0.009.  
On categorical memories, an overall Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that the groups differed 
significantly, χ2 (2) = 6.95, p = .03. Mann-Whitney U tests indicated that DID patients scored 
significantly higher on number of categorical memories compared to healthy controls, U = 259.50, z = 
2.54, p = .013, r = 0.40, and that they tended to score higher than PTSD patients, although this 
difference was marginally significant, U = 217.00, z = 1.72, p = .098, r = 0.28. PTSD patients did not 
differ significantly from healthy controls, U = 464.00, z = 1.26, p = .21, r = 0.17. 
On semantic associates, an overall Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that the groups differed 
significantly, χ2 (2) = 13.40, p = .001. On this measure, Mann-Whitney U tests indicated that PTSD 
patients scored significantly higher than healthy controls U = 507.00, z = 2.20, p = .03, r = .29, but 
significantly lower compared to DID patients, U = 231.00, z = 2.21, p = .04, r = 0.35. DID patients 
scored significantly higher compared to healthy controls, U = 278.50, z = 3.42, p = .002, r = 0.53. 
We also explored retrieval times. No significant difference between groups emerged for 
either the mean time to respond, F(2,62) = 0.52, p = .60, partial η2= 0.02, or the mean time to 
retrieve specific memories, F(2,61) = 1.07, p = .35, partial η2= .03.  
The group comparison on ratings of trauma-relatedness for specific memories indicated a 
significant main effect of participant group, F(2, 61) = 9.15, p < .001, partial η2  =.23. Group 
comparisons indicated that PTSD patients (p < .001) and DID patients (p < .001) scored significantly 
higher on trauma-relatedness for their retrieved specific memories as compared to healthy controls. 
The difference between the DID and PTSD patients did not reach significance (p = .79).  
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With respect to the valence ratings of specific memories, an ANOVA indicated significant 
differences for the participant groups, F(2, 61) = 5.85, p = .005, partial η2  =.16. Group comparisons 
indicated that PTSD patients (p = .001) but not DID patients (p = .15) rated their specific memories as 
more neutral (i.e., less positive) compared to healthy controls. The differences between the patient 
groups were not significant (p = .64). Finally, an overall Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that there was a 
marginally significant difference between  the groups for mean age of the specific memory, χ2 (2) = 
5.67, p = .06. 
Discussion 
We investigated memory specificity in patients with DID and patients with PTSD. We first 
focus on the hypothesized differential functioning on the AMT task of apparently normal and trauma 
identity states in patients with DID. DID patients tended to rate the memories retrieved in their 
trauma identity state  as more trauma-related as compared to those retrieved in their  apparently 
normal identity. Also, the DID patients were faster to retrieve specific memories in the apparently 
normal state. However, the faster responding in this state was a more general finding found on all 
retrieval trials and possibly reflected a strategy, which is fast responding in order to prevent the 
remembering of trauma-related memories triggered by the test cue words (Dorahy, 2001). More 
importantly, and in contrast to the hypothesis of differential identity responding, we did not find 
patients to retrieve fewer specific memories in their apparently normal identities compared to their 
trauma identities nor did we find any differences between identities in the type of overgeneral 
memories retrieved (i.e., extended, categorical, semantic associates). Also, we did not find the 
patients to retrieve more negative or older specific memories in their trauma states as compared to 
their apparently normal state. The latter finding is not in agreement with the earlier case study by 
Bryant (1995), in which different identities retrieved memories from different time periods. This may 
have been a result of different identity selection criteria. In the case study, the memory retrieval of 
the host identity was compared to a nine-year-old child identity, with the latter reporting older 
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memories compared to the host identity. In the current study, however, trauma and apparently 
normal identities of different ages were included (i.e., not only child trauma identities)9.  
Simulators were included in the current study because this is common practice in the field of 
DID study. The results indicated that simulators performed according to instructions. They retrieved 
more trauma-related memories in their trauma state and they dated these memories as older 
compared to the apparently normal state. Interestingly, the patients did not show exactly the same 
performance pattern as simulators (i.e., with no differences between identity states in age of the 
retrieved memories but faster responding on all trials in their apparently normal state). The patients 
thus did not seem to consciously simulate differences between identities on these measures. 
Besides investigating differential identity functioning, we also wanted to compare the overall 
DID patient performance to that of PTSD patients. Both on self-reported avoidance and on the AMT 
task, the results for DID patients very much resembled those of the PTSD patients. Patients in both 
groups reported more experiential and behavioral avoidance compared to the healthy controls. Most 
importantly, on the AMT task, both patient groups showed clear evidence of reduced memory 
specificity and both patient groups rated their memories as more trauma-related compared to 
healthy controls. We thus found evidence of overgeneral memory in both PTSD patients as well as 
DID patients compared to controls but did not find that DID patients were characterized by a more 
overgeneral memory retrieval style compared to the PTSD patients. 
Interestingly, we did find differences between the patient groups in the type of overgeneral 
memories retrieved. Specifically, the DID patients were characterized by the retrieval of significantly 
more semantic associates compared to the PTSD patients.In addition, they tended to retrieve more 
categorical memories and fewer extended memories compared to the PTSD patients. In terms of 
                                                          
9 The patients reported a mean age of 21 (SD = 13.58, range 7-49) for the selected trauma 
identities in this study and 32 (SD=18.31, range 7-58) for the apparently normal identities.  
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autobiographical memory functioning, DID patients thus seem to truncate their search at a higher, 
more general level, not moving down to the more concrete level of extended and then specific 
memories containing perceptual–sensory details of events. The PTSD patients retrieved significantly 
more extended memories compared to controls a well as more semantic associates. 
A limitation of the current study is the relatively small DID sample size as compared to other 
samples in which overgeneral memory has been studied (e.g., depression, PTSD). We have partly 
tackled the limitation by the inclusion of control groups of adequate size. The resulting effect sizes as 
reported indicated medium to large effect sizes. Despite the small sample size, we believe it is 
important to report these results as to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of 
overgeneral memory in a sample of dissociative patients and given that theoretical accounts of DID 
specifically emphasize the cognitive avoidance abilities in these patients.  
As a second limitation, we could not adequately control for other comorbid psychopathology, 
most importantly depression, which is known to contribute independently to reduced 
autobiographical memory specificity (see Giesbrecht, Lynn, Lilienfeld, & Merckelbach, 2008). Because 
the control and patient groups differed significantly on this measure, controlling for depression10 
(i.e., using an ANCOVA) is not completely appropriate (see Miller & Chapman, 2001, for a thorough 
discussion on the use of analysis of covariance in psychopathology research). Future studies aiming 
to investigate the issue of comorbidity will have to include samples of patients with comorbid 
depression and compare those to samples without comorbid depression as diagnosed with a valid 
diagnostic tool. 
The current results may have theoretical and diagnostic implications that speak to both the 
fields of trauma and dissociation, and that of overgeneral memory. To begin with the latter field, the 
results of the present study indicate that patients with a history of trauma are characterized by 
                                                          
10
 An ANCOVA on memory specificity with the inclusion of the depression BSI score as a covariate showed a 
significant effect of depression, F(1, 61) = 7.43, p = .008, partial η
2
 = .11, while the group effect was no longer 
significant, F(2, 61) = .96, p = .39, partial η
2
 = .03. 
  23 
 
reduced memory specificity. Unlike previous studies, the present study employed patients who were 
characterized by complex trauma (i.e., severe and repeated childhood sexual and physical trauma in 
combination with neglect). Second, considering the field of trauma and dissociation,  the converging 
results in this study for the DID and PTSD patients may be taken as supportive of including both types 
of patients in a joint diagnostic category of posttraumatic disorders linked to disturbing memories of 
prolonged interpersonal trauma starting in early childhood. Overgeneral memory may be involved in 
the maintenance of the symptoms of such a joint diagnostic entity. Other evidence supporting the 
idea of such a joint category comes from studies on comorbidity of PTSD in samples of DID patients, 
which is very high, (i.e., between 80% and 100%). For example, in a 2011 study of 44 DID patients, 
98% showed comorbid PTSD (Rodewald, Wilhelm-Gößling, Emrich, Reddemann, & Gast, 2011; see 
also Boon & Draijer, 1993; Ellason, Ross, & Fuchs, 1996; Middleton & Butler, 2001). DID cases without 
comorbid PTSD thus can be considered as rare. In the current sample, we did not systematically 
assess PTSD diagnostic status in the DID patients, but we did assess PTSD symptom severity on which 
the DID patients scored comparably to PTSD patients and above the clinical cut-off of 15 as suggested 
by Wohlfarth, van den Brink, Winkel, and ter Smitten (2003). The veridicality of reported trauma 
memories in DID, and the validity of the diagnostic distinction between the dissociative disorders and 
(complex) PTSD is the subject of discussion in the literature (e.g., van der Hart, Nijenhuis, & Steele, 
2005). Also, the inclusion of a dissociative subtype of PTSD in the DSM-5 raises the question how and 
if this subtype can be distinguished from the dissociative disorders (for related empirical research see 
Lanius, Vermetten, Loewenstein, Brand, Schmahl, Bremner, & Spiegel, 2010; Stein et al., 2013; Wolf, 
Miller, Reardon, Ryabchenko, Castillo, & Freund, 2012).  The results of the current study as well as 
previous findings of a lack of interidentity amnesia in DID (as discussed in the introduction) 
contribute to this discussion as they indicate similarities in symptomatology and memory functioning 
in DID and PTSD patients. These empirical results thus call into question the need for a separate 
dissociative disorders category and instead substantiate a view of a joint (complex) PTSD category 
ranging on a continuum from dissociative to nondissociative. 
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The suggestion of a combined diagnostic category for PTSD and the dissociative disorders 
offers an alternative view to the existing opposing theoretical views of DID. As mentioned above, 
many theories of dissociation are based on the idea that dissociative patients have the ability to 
selectively forget or compartmentalize information linked to negative emotions in order to minimize 
distress. The different identities are supposed to serve different functions, that is avoidant 
responding in the apparently normal identity state and trauma preoccupation in the trauma state.  
Based on this trauma view, we predicted a tendency to retrieve fewer specific memories in the 
apparently normal identity state. In addition, the patients in this identity state were expected to 
retrieve relatively neutral, non-trauma-related, and recent memories. In contrast, in the trauma state 
we expected patients to retrieve negatively-valenced, trauma-related and relatively early memories. 
The results did not agree with our hypotheses as based on the trauma view of DID, except for a 
marginally significant finding indicating relatively more trauma-related memories in the trauma state 
(as rated by the patient).  
The current results do not solve the discussion regarding the etiology of DID nor the 
genuineness of the trauma memories as reported by these patients. Possibly, iatrogenetically created 
trauma ‘memories’ would also be related to a lack of memory specificity. This possibility may be an 
interesting topic for future research. Also, further studies will be needed to disentangle the 
transdiagnostic similarities and differences in memory retrieval between the current samples and 
patients with PTSD resulting from single traumatizing experiencing in adulthood, and other patients 
with a known history of trauma.  
Additionally, in the current study we focused on functional avoidance as a possible 
mechanism underlying the lack of memory specificity found in patients suffering from posttraumatic 
complaints.  However, other mechanisms such as impaired executive control may (also) be involved 
(Williams et al., 2007). Future studies of autobiographical memory functioning in dissociative 
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disorders should thus include additional measures to further investigate the mechanisms underlying 
overgeneral memory in this population.  
In sum, the main findings in this study were that both DID patients (regardless of identity) 
and PTSD patients were characterized by a lack of memory specificity. For these patients, the lack of 
specificity will have a detrimental impact on daily life functioning including problem solving and 
mood repair, for which recalling related instances from the past are essential. It is in these areas 
that future studies can provide insight beneficial for these individuals.   
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Table 1 
Participants’ Demographics and Median Scores (and Range) on Measures of Trauma History, Psychopathological Symptoms, and Trauma-
Related Experiential Avoidance 
 
 
 
DID 
(n = 12) 
____________________ 
PTSD 
(n = 27) 
____________________ 
Controls 
(n = 29) 
____________________ 
Simulators 
(n = 26) 
____________________ 
Age 41.00 (22.00 – 63.00) 41.00 (22.00 – 66.00) 39.00 (25.00 – 61.00) 46.00 (22.00 – 70.00) 
Level of education 6.00 (1.00 – 6.00) 5.00 (3.00 – 7.00) 6.00 (4.00 – 7.00)  6.00 (3.00 – 7.00) 
TEC 13.00 (4.00 – 23.00)  11.00 (2.00 – 21.00)  2.00 (0.00 – 7.00)  1.50 (0.00- 6.00) 
DES 44.64 (21.85 - 66.43) 20.36 (0.00 - 58.21) 7.14 (1.07 - 17.50)  5.18 (1.07 - 26.07) 
PSS-SR 29.00 (20.00 – 49.00) 32.00 (23.00 – 48.00) 3.00 (0.00 – 17.00) 2.00 (0.00 – 15.00) 
AAQ-TS 
PABQ 
4.85 (3.35 - 5.41) 
63.00 (43.00 – 72.00) 
4.31 (3.03 - 5.35) 
56.00 (42.00 – 85.00)  
2.11 (1.16 - 3.51) 
31.00 (25.00 – 52.00)  
2.05 (1.05 - 2.97) 
30.50 (25.00 – 52.00) 
BSI-depression 1.92 (0.67 - 4.00)  2.83 (0.67 - 4.00) 0.17 (0.00 - 1.67) 0.17 (0.00 - 1.00) 
 
 Note. Education was assessed on a scale from 1 (low) to high (7)(Verhage, 1964). TEC = Traumatic Experiences Checklist; DES = 
Dissociative Experiences Scale; PSS-SR = PTSD Symptom Scale Self-Report version; AAQ-TS = trauma-related version of the Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire; PABQ = Posttraumatic Avoidance Behaviour Questionnaire; BSI = Brief Symptom Inventory.  
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Table 2 
Mean Number of Specific, Extended, and Categorical Memories, Semantic Associates, Time to Respond, 
Valence, Trauma-Relatedness, and Age of Retrieved Memories in the Apparently Normal t and Trauma Identity 
State for DID Patients and Simulators 
 DID 
(n = 12) 
_______________ 
Simulators 
(n = 26) 
_______________ 
Specific Memories 
   Apparently Normal Identity  
   Trauma Identity   
 
4.75 (2.26)  
5.33 (2.87) 
 
6.38 (2.37)  
5.88 (2.50) 
Extended Memories 
   Apparently Normal Identity 
   Trauma Identity 
 
0.67 (1.23) 
0.58 (0.90) 
 
0.58 (0.70) 
0.31 (0.62) 
Categorical Memories 
   Apparently Normal Identity 
   Trauma Identity 
 
1.83 (1.64) 
2.00 (1.41) 
 
0.73 (1.00) 
1.27 (1.25) 
Semantic Associates 
   Apparently Normal Identity 
   Trauma Identity 
 
2.33(2.57) 
1.33 (1.37) 
 
0.58 (0.86) 
0.35 (0.89) 
Time (in s) to Respond 
   Apparently Normal Identity 
   Trauma Identity 
 
11.20 (5.09)  
16.70 (8.07) 
 
14.04 (7.20)  
14.73 (6.77) 
Time (in s) to Retrieve Specific Memory 
   Apparently Normal Identity 
   Trauma Identity   
 
10.20 (4.33)  
14.34 (7.21) 
 
13.79 (8.07)  
15.30 (10.97) 
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Valence   
   Apparently Normal Identity 
   Trauma Identity 
 
4.57 (1.27) 
4.22 (1.34) 
 
4.34 (.70)  
4.35 (1.11) 
Trauma-Relatedness   
   Apparently Normal Identity 
   Trauma Identity   
 
3.12 (1.69)  
4.25 (1.66) 
 
2.91 (1.73)  
4.99 (1.54) 
Age of Memory (in Years)  
   Apparently Normal Identity 
   Trauma Identity 
 
11.54 (15.73)  
10.26 (15.56) 
 
7.75 (9.62)  
18.02 (15.00) 
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Table 3 
Mean Number of Specific, Extended, and Categorical Memories, Semantic Associates, Time to Respond, 
Valence, Trauma-Relatedness, and Age of Retrieved Memories for DID Patients, PTSD patients, and Controls. 
 DID 
(n = 12) 
_______________ 
PTSD 
(n = 27) 
______________ 
Controls 
(n = 29) 
_____________ 
Specific Memories 5.04 (2.12) 4.93 (2.27) 6.83 (1.81) 
Extended Memories  0.63 (0.71) 1.26 (1.06) 0.66 (0.77) 
Categorical Memories 1.92 (1.29) 1.19 (0.96) 0.90 (0.98) 
Semantic Associates 1.83 (1.57) 0.78 (0.85) 0.34 (0.72) 
Time (in s) to Respond 13.95 (6.09) 14.98 (6.86) 13.19 (6.61) 
Time (in s) to Retrieve  
a Specific Memory 
12.27 (5.07) 
 
14.76 (6.85) 12.29 (6.16) 
Valence   4.40 (0.78) 4.11 (0.90) 4.93 (0.67) 
Trauma-Relatedness   3.59 (1.34) 4.00(1.56) 1.94 (0.85) 
Age of Memory (in Years)  10.90 (15.12) 5.61 (6.77) 2.87 (2.80) 
 
 
